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本文以电力、煤气水务上市公司为样本,研究国有企业高管政治关联对企业绩效的影响。研究表明,总体上讲,国有企业高管政治关联对企业绩效呈负向影响;国有非控股(国有股小于30%)公司政治关联对企业绩效具有正向影响;国有控股(国有股大于等于30%)公司政治关联对企业业绩具有负影响。从政治关联的来源看,董事长政治关联对企业绩效具有正相关效应。
Abstract：Under the transition econom,took the phenomenon of political association prevalent in contemporary China.This article electric power listed companies for the sample of state-owned enterprises executives's political connections on firm performance.Studies show that,on the whole the executives's political connections of state-owned enterprises associate negative influence on business performance.And state-owned of non-controlling(state-owned shares is less than 30%) corporate political connections have a positive impact on firm performance.State-controlled(state-owned shares is greater than or equal to 30%) company politics associated with the negative impact on corporate performance.Seen from the source of political association,the chairman of the political association was positive correlation effects on firm performance,while the general manager of political association has a negative effect on firm performance.
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基本信息:
DOI：
中图分类号:F276.1;F224
引用信息:
[1]胡世明,杜滨.转型经济下国有企业政治关联对绩效影响的研究——以电力、煤气及水的生产和供应业为例[J].华北电力大学学报(社会科学版),2012,No.79(05):34-41.
基金信息: