华北电力大学学报(社会科学版)

碳市场是实现双碳目标的重要手段,我国在碳市场运行初期对纳入碳市场的行业进行配额时都是免费分配,在未来将适时采用有偿分配的分配方式。为探究有偿分配制度下影响企业在碳市场交易及政府监管策略的因素,构建了政府与企业之间的演化博弈模型,对不同情境下的系统演化稳定策略进行确定,并选取了相关数据进行仿真分析。分析结果表明,在碳配额有偿分配制度下,政府与企业之间存在不同的演化博弈结果，各主体间策略选择互相影响，中央政府的策略选择会受地方政府的影响，但作为政策的推动者，始终会选择严格监管的策略；在碳市场建设初期政府除牵头为企业寻找交易对象外，还应给予交易双方相应的交易奖励；随着参与碳交易的企业逐渐增加，中央政府受监管成本影响，其策略选择也会发生改变，本文从四方博弈的主体出发，为有偿分配制度下碳市场交易制度及运行模式提供了系统的理论指导。

The carbon market is an important means to achieve the dual carbon goals. In the early stages of carbon market operation, China adopted a free allocation method for quota allocation of industries included in the carbon market. In the future, a paid allocation method will be adopted in a timely manner. To explore the factors that affect enterprises in carbon market trading and government regulatory strategies under the paid allocation system, an evolutionary game model between the government and enterprises was constructed. The stable strategy of system evolution in different scenarios was determined, and relevant data was selected for simulation analysis. The analysis results showed that under the paid allocation system of carbon quotas, there are different evolutionary game results between the government and enterprises, and the strategic choices of various entities affect each other. The transaction cost of enterprises has a negative impact on trading enterprises. In the early stage of carbon market construction, the government should not only lead the search for trading partners for enterprises, but also provide corresponding trading rewards to both parties. As the number of enterprises participating in carbon trading gradually increases, the central government's strategic choices will also change due to regulatory costs. Starting from the main body of the four party game, this article provides systematic theoretical guidance for the carbon market trading system and operating mode under the paid distribution system.